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A B S T R A C T   
Nationalization was once anathema to neoliberals and the hydrocarbon-based corporations long closely inte-
grated with the neoliberal project. Indeed, the origins of neoliberal advocacy for global economic liberalisation 
can be traced, at least in part, to the resistance of oil multinationals to nationalist governments attempting to 
assert ownership and control over natural resources. It is therefore striking that calls are now mounting from this 
quarter for the nationalization of fossil fuel infrastructures, to keep them operating as climate policy, loss of 
public legitimacy and changing market conditions increasingly make investments in them unprofitable, unin-
surable, or uncompetitive. The Canadian government’s purchase of the Trans Mountain Pipeline exemplifies 
what we term a ‘neoliberal nationalization’. Neoliberal pundits and oil industry figures created the perception of 
both an immediate economic crisis and a longer-term crisis of investor confidence in Canada; these ‘crises’ were 
used to justify the nationalization. Critically, the government acquisition of the pipeline was framed as a tem-
porary measure of last resort. The intention of a neoliberal nationalization is to protect corporate actors from the 
effects of their own irresponsible business practises, maintaining ‘business as usual’ by pre-emptively socializing 
the foreseeable risks of rapid capital asset devaluation. In the case of hydrocarbon infrastructures like Trans 
Mountain, state authority is called upon to ensure the continued profitability of private fossil energy extraction, 
even as global financial markets accelerate disinvestment from the sector in response to evidence that most fossil 
fuels must remain in the ground to prevent catastrophic climate change.   
1. Introduction 
In May 2021, the International Energy Agency (IEA), an historically 
pro-fossil fuel intergovernmental body, released a new Net-Zero Emis-
sions (NZE) by 2050 Scenario (IEA, 2021). The NZE presents a decar-
bonization pathway for the world economy consistent with limiting 
global temperature rise to 1.5 ◦C, the ambition of signatories to the Paris 
climate agreement. Importantly, this would require an immediate halt to 
all new investment in fossil fuel supply projects. The IEA report 
confirmed what many scholars and activists had been arguing for years: 
deep decarbonization cannot be achieved without supply-side policies 
aimed at reducing the volume of fossil fuels which are to be extracted 
and burned to ‘net’ zero (Lazarus & van Asselt, 2018). 
To date, most government responses to climate change have focused 
on dampening demand for fossil fuels through carbon pricing (carbon 
taxes and emissions trading schemes) and policy support for investments 
in energy efficiency and renewable energy. However, these policies are 
increasingly viewed as inadequate on their own (Tvinnereim & Mehling, 
2018; Green, 2021). The imperative to cease extraction of fossil fuels has 
been recognized in a small number of jurisdictions. There are partial or 
total moratoriums on new leases for oil and gas projects in France, New 
Zealand, Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and California (SEI 
et al., 2020; Gerretsen, 2021; O’Sullivan, 2021; Singh, 2021). 
With little prospect of similar legislation in major hydrocarbon- 
exporting states such as Canada and Australia, climate activists are 
building coalitions aimed at keeping fossil fuels in the ground by other 
means (Carter and McKenzie, 2020). Divestment campaigns, blockades, 
and legal action are delaying fossil fuel extraction and transport infra-
structure projects in these countries and increasing the costs of doing 
business in the fossil fuel sector. A prime example is the broad #Sto-
pAdani coalition (Stop Adani, n.d.), which has effectively prevented the 
Adani Group from financing the construction of a large coal mine in 
Queensland, Australia, despite governments legislating special tax hol-
idays and exemptions from Native Title and environmental law. Faced 
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with similar opposition to its plans to expand the Trans Mountain 
Pipeline (which carries synthetic crude oil from Alberta to the west coast 
of Canada), Kinder Morgan announced that it could not proceed in the 
face of “unquantifiable risk” (Kinder Morgan [KM], 2018a). Rather than 
letting the expansion project fail, the Canadian government decided to 
purchase the pipeline. 
Public ownership of fossil fuel companies and associated infra-
structure has historical precedents in Canada, and in many other nations 
remains commonplace. In this article, we argue that the Trans Mountain 
nationalization notably departs from such histories, as it was primarily 
aimed at socializing the climate risks of private capital, rather than 
ensuring national sovereignty over natural resources. In this sense, it is 
more akin to the (partial) bank and automotive company nationaliza-
tions that accompanied government financial bailouts in the wake of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Building on literature that has charac-
terized such nationalizations as ‘neoliberal’, we further suggest that 
what might be deemed a ‘nationalist turn’ is emerging amongst 
neoliberal protagonists and politicians aligned with fossil capital, who 
have floated similar proposals to nationalize fossil fuel projects to keep 
them operating as changing market conditions make them unprofitable, 
uninsurable, or uncompetitive. 
Rather than define neoliberalism as a set of philosophical proposi-
tions (‘freedom of the marketplace’) or policy prescriptions (free trade, 
privatisation, deregulation, fiscal austerity), we follow the analytical 
approach developed by Mirowski and Plehwe (2009), who identify 
neoliberals as voluntary members of a network comprised of academics, 
politicians and business leaders which has grown, evolved and consol-
idated its influence over time. This empirical method treats the global 
membership of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS, established by Friedrich 
Hayek in 1947) and of the c. 500 ‘thinktanks’ coordinated by the Atlas 
Network (established 1981) - whose senior staff are usually MPS mem-
bers - as the definitive structural feature of what they term the ‘neolib-
eral thought collective’.1 Critical scholarship on the economic, political 
and legal theories advanced by Euro-American MPS intellectuals, such 
as Hayek, Friedman, Bork and Buchanan, is now substantial. Yet re-
searchers have only recently began to account for the lesser-known MPS 
members of post-colonial nations (Slobodian and Plehwe, forthcoming). 
Moreover, social scientists have yet to systematically analyse the 
consistent role of oil wealth and carbon-intensive corporations in 
financing the academic bases and civil society organisations of the 
global neoliberal network, which has arguably been the primary source 
of ‘scepticism’ toward climate science and policy in the public sphere for 
at least three decades.2 This relationship is certainly evident in the ‘first 
world petro-politics’ of Canada and Australia, where the think-tanks, 
academics and activists comprising the local branches of the network 
have integral, if rarely disclosed, relationships with fossil fuel majors 
(Corporate Mapping Project, 2017; Neubauer, 2018; Walker, 
forthcoming). 
Several authors have highlighted the importance of “fossil fuel in-
cumbency” in explaining why “in spite of the evidence of potentially 
catastrophic climate change, governments and corporations still invest 
heavily in fossil fuels” (Newell & Johnstone, 2018, p.67). The political 
authority of governments and the economic power of hydrocarbon- 
based industries are frequently highly integrated (Carroll, 2020). A 
‘revolving door’ between government and fossil industry exists to the 
very highest levels of office in many countries. For example, President 
Trump appointed the former head of ExxonMobil Rex Tillerson as Sec-
retary of State, and Mike Pompeo, the ‘Congressman from Koch’, as head 
of the CIA, and later Secretary of State. However, we argue that such 
examples ought not be explained away as merely episodic instances of 
cronyism or corruption. If we are to understand the systemic nature of 
fossil capital’s capacity to capture state policy, we must recognize the 
foundational, century-long historical association of the global academic 
and political infrastructure of neoliberalism with hydrocarbon-intensive 
corporations such as Standard Oil/ExxonMobil,3 and more recently, 
Koch Industries (Walker, 2020, pp.21–31). 
In this article, we demonstrate how the Canadian government’s de-
cision to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline was made in the context 
of fabricated crises, espoused by neoliberals, about both the economics 
of the tar sands and about Canada’s ‘investment climate’ more broadly. 
It was also made with heavy involvement and support from key oilsands 
industry players. The push for nationalization by oil executives and the 
tacit approval of Canadian members of the neoliberal network confirms 
that neoliberal public narratives claiming principled commitments to 
‘free markets’ and ‘the rule of law’ should be regarded as merely tactical 
conceits, expendable positions that will be jettisoned when they cease to 
serve the strategic concerns of fossil capital. Prior to delving into the 
details of the case, the next section explores the broader topic of 
nationalization to provide context to our argument that the purchase of 
the pipeline can be accurately understood as a neoliberal 
nationalization. 
2. Perspectives on nationalization 
Nationalization is “the process of a government taking control of a 
business or industry” (Cambridge, 2021, n.p.). It would typically involve 
a government holding a majority stake in a company, if not owning it 
outright. Arguments for nationalization have traditionally focussed on 
securing public ownership and control of ‘natural monopolies’ – in-
frastructures so capital intensive and vital to everyday life that their 
construction, maintenance and universal service provision would be 
unlikely to be provided by multiple businesses in competition with one 
another for profit – such as coal-fired electricity grids and railway 
networks. 
Nationalization has been strongly identified with ‘socialism’ by 
neoliberal authors (Mirowski, 2009, p.436). Friedrich Hayek’s The Road 
to Serfdom (1944), often cited as the founding text of the ‘neoliberal 
thought collective’, was written for a popular audience to counter 
widespread public support in Britain for the comprehensive welfare 
state proposed by the Beveridge Report, and brought into being 
following the landslide 1945 Labour victory of Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee.4 Full employment, pensions, universal healthcare and education 
would be supported by the nationalization of coal mines, steelworks, 
railways, electricity and gas networks (all fossil fuel-intensive in-
frastructures). Hayek claimed that nationalization was a slippery slope 
toward totalitarian socialism, as the “[t]he machinery of monopoly be-
comes identical with the machinery of the state” (Hayek, 1944, p.207). 
1 The 2013 MPS membership directory is available at DeSmogBlog.com. (n. 
d.), whilst the Atlas Network (2021) lists affiliated organisations on its website.  
2 Compare the Atlas Network (2021) US member directory with the list of 
Exxon-funded organisations composed by Greenpeace (n.d) and the funding 
networks mapped by Brulle (2014). 
3 Whilst mergers, joint ventures, re-brandings, subsidiaries and cross- 
holdings make it difficult to maintain corporate identities over time, it is 
worth noting that nearly all the current non-state Western oil majors are to 
some extent descendants of Standard Oil, which was broken up into 34 separate 
companies after being declared an illegal monopoly in 1911 by the US Supreme 
Court. The largest of these successor companies were Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (later Exxon), and Standard Oil of New York (later Mobil), which merged 
in 1999 to form ExxonMobil. 
4 The commitment of Attlees’s government to social-democratic nationali-
zation was not internationalist. When in 1951 the elected parliament of Iran led 
by PM Mohammed Mossadegh passed acts for the nationalization of oil assets 
held by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later BP - in which the British government 
held the majority stake between 1914 and 1979), the UK lodged an action 
against Iran in the International Court of Justice (Pahuja & Storr 2017) and sent 
the British Navy to blockade oil tanker traffic from Iran. Mossadegh would be 
overthrown, along with Iranian democracy, in a UK-USA orchestrated coup 
d’etat in 1953. 
K. Tienhaara and J. Walker                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Geoforum 124 (2021) 120–131
122
Up to this point in his career, Hayek’s income had largely been provided 
by the Standard Oil fortune via Rockefeller Foundation grants: in the late 
1930s, Hayek supervised Standard Oil heir David Rockefeller’s doctoral 
studies at the London School of Economics (Plehwe, 2009, p. 11; Fisher, 
1980, p. 290). 
Despite the claims of Hayek (and of US Cold War propaganda against 
anti-colonial nationalist movements), nationalization was never the 
exclusive preserve of socialist parties. This was recognized even by anti- 
socialist organizations such as the Institute of Public Affairs (an 
Australian corporate lobby established in 1943 by mining interests, now 
one of many fossil-funded Atlas units promoting the obstruction of 
climate policy): “Long before socialism became a burning question, even 
before there was a Labour Party in Australia, public opinion and political 
parties strongly supported the state ownership of public utilities” (Anon, 
1947, p.3). That nationalization has come to be perceived as ‘socialist’ is 
largely an effect of the triumph of the global advocacy of neoliberals for 
the de-nationalization of economic policymaking. 
2.1. Nationalization in the oil sector 
In the extractive sector, proponents of nationalization are frequently 
concerned by the threat to national development and sovereign political 
autonomy presented by foreign ownership and control over depletable 
assets which are, at least in theory, the ‘common wealth’ of the nation. 
Nationalization of hydrocarbon and other mineral resources would re-
turn control of extractive industries to public (state) ownership, con-
verting resource rents otherwise expatriated as profit to foreign 
stockholders into income streams for government expenditure, and 
resolving the perennial problem of compelling powerful corporate ac-
tors to comply with taxation and other local legal obligations (Allende, 
1972). Social democratic parties advocated for nationalization of energy 
and other infrastructures on public interest grounds, including to check 
the tendency of private monopolies to concentrate wealth and power 
into “gigantic corporations” - once understood also by liberals as a 
profound risk to constitutional democracy (Van Horn, 2010). 
In the early years of the oil industry, developing nations did not 
possess the financial capital or technical capacity to extract and market 
oil wealth. Nor did they possess the diplomatic or military capacity to 
assert effective national sovereignty over this most coveted of natural 
resources. The global oil industry was significantly monopolised by 
powerful corporations based in the US and Western Europe, and none 
more so than Standard Oil, which thoroughly dominated the American 
petroleum industry by the end of the 19th century, by the early 20th 
becoming among the world’s first truly global multinational enterprise. 
Global corporations extracting raw materials from resource peripheries 
were highly vertically integrated: their strategic interests in preventing 
both free-market competition and nationalizations were closely aligned 
with those of Western states, whose military and economic pre- 
eminence was dependent on securing world-spanning supply chains of 
oil, copper, and other strategic minerals (Moran, 1971). 
The first significant oil nationalization occurred in the Soviet Union. 
Oil companies such as Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell, courted by 
Lenin between 1920 and 1923 to modernize the then largest oilfield in 
the world at Baku (Azerbaijan), were displaced by the state-owned oil 
company Azneft (Gillette, 1973). Mexico followed suit in 1938, although 
its reserves were not nearly as significant. Until the early 1970s, Middle 
Eastern oil resources were largely controlled by the ‘Seven Sisters’ cartel 
of Western oil firms, five of which were US-based. By 1946, Exxon, BP, 
Shell, Gulf, Texaco, Mobil, and Chevron controlled 90% of the interna-
tional oil trade. With the military and diplomatic support of the Western 
powers, these companies managed to dominate the largest oil reserves 
and extract monopoly rents by negotiating carve-up agreements among 
themselves aimed at “restricting output at the production stage and 
maintaining acceptable market shares without price discounting when 
they sold the oil to outsiders” (Moran 1987, pp. 585 & 580). 
Following WW2, a wave of nationalist movements (e.g., in Iraq and 
Iran) sought to renegotiate the oil concessions and establish national 
sovereignty over oil reserves, culminating in the 1960 establishment by 
developing nations of OPEC, which would eventually become an effec-
tive counter-cartel to the Seven Sisters. In 1962, the UN General As-
sembly adopted resolution 1803 (XVII) on the “Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources”, which would be cited through the 1960s and 
1970s by developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the 
Middle East seeking to nationalize assets operated by multinational 
corporations. By 1976, “virtually every significant LDC oil producer had 
nationalized its industry” (Kobrin et al., 1984, p.137). 
Importantly, proposals for the nationalization of hydrocarbon assets 
were not restricted to the developing world. In 1975, Pierre Trudeau’s 
government created Petro-Canada, a national oil company that began 
purchasing fossil assets with a view to “Canadianization” of the oil in-
dustry (Goodermote and Mancke, 1983), at a time when Norway, 
Australia and the UK were also passing legislation to establish national 
oil companies. Such was the context in which the proposals of neo-
liberals for a global economic constitution to insulate transnational 
capital from national parliaments (Slobodian, 2018) were aggressively 
asserted, and corporate funds began flowing to the think-tanks of the 
Atlas Network. 
2.2. Fossil capital’s nationalist turn 
To a significant degree, the ‘free market’ philosophy promoted since 
the 1930s by neoliberals and from the 1970s increasingly embedded in 
international economic institutions and investment treaties was specif-
ically developed to prevent social democratic and post-colonial gov-
ernments pursuing nationalist strategies of industrial and social 
development, often predicated upon the nationalization of strategic 
mineral resources and infrastructures. Now, as the free market begins to 
abandon the fossil fuel sector, certain voices within the Atlas Network 
are reciprocating, calling liberalism into question and discovering the 
virtues of conservative nationalism and nationalist industry policy – as 
Alejandro Chafuen (MPS member, board member of the Fraser Institute, 
Canada’s premier Atlas-affiliated think tank, and Atlas Network presi-
dent and CEO from 1991 to 2018) reports in a recent article (2019). 
This is also manifesting in proposals from politicians aligned with 
fossil capital. In 2018, the Trump Administration investigated whether it 
could invoke wartime emergency measures to effectively nationalize 
struggling coal power plants in order to keep them open (Kaufman, 
2018). The plan was dropped due to legal and cost concerns (St. John, 
2018). Something very similar occurred in Australia. The energy com-
pany AGL announced in 2015 that Liddell Power Station (a 48-year-old 
coal-fired power plant built by a state-owned public electricity monop-
oly, later privatised), would be closed in 2022, and the site used for 
cleaner and cheaper electricity generation. In 2017, the federal gov-
ernment urged AGL to keep it running, claiming that its closure would 
result in electricity shortages, but the company remained firm on the 
decision (Latimer, 2016). In March 2018, a group of MPs from the ruling 
Liberal/National Coalition called on the government to nationalize the 
plant (Koziol, 2018). They were rebuffed by then Prime Minister Mal-
colm Turnbull, who noted that “nationalising assets is what the Liberal 
Party was founded to stop governments doing” (Kenny, 2018, n.p.). 
However, MPS member John Roskam of the abovementioned Institute of 
Public Affairs—an Atlas unit closely associated with the Liberal Party, 
and a long-term advocate of electricity privatisation—made a strong 
statement in support of the proposal: “[t]he reality is that the govern-
ment has broken energy policy in this country, and government inter-
vention might be required to fix it” (2018, n.p.). 
These proposals for nationalization from political actors that other-
wise claim to strongly support the free market may seem at first sur-
prising. However, the way nationalization is envisioned by hydrocarbon 
corporations and the neoliberal pundits who pursue their public policy 
objectives at arms-length is quite distinct from traditional conceptions of 
nationalization familiar from the history of the oil and gas sector, where 
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state-owned corporations ensure direct control over resource develop-
ment and the collection of resource rents for sovereign wealth funds and 
redistributive welfare. Exemplary here is the relation between Norway’s 
StatOil (recently renamed Equinor) and its Government Pension Fund 
(Austvik, 2014). 
The proposals in Australia and from the Trump Administration have 
some of the hallmarks as the emergency government ‘interventions’ and 
partial bank nationalizations during the GFC. In the context of the po-
tential failure of the global banking system, these were defended as 
measures of last resort, only to be used in extreme circumstances when 
the alternative (to let the company/industry fail) would have dire eco-
nomic repercussions (Kitromildes, 2010). These exceptions to neoliberal 
doctrines were supposed to be “temporary [..] to be reversed as soon as 
market conditions permit” (Kitromildes, 2010, p.150). As President 
George W. Bush put it in announcing the first US banking bailout: “the 
government’s role will be limited and temporary…these measures are 
not intended to take over the free market, but to preserve it” (Bush, 
2008, n.p.). 
Even after Bush was replaced by Barack Obama in the White House, 
the role of the US Government remained limited to providing public 
funds to ensure private companies remained solvent, without significant 
public interest conditions being attached to the bailouts, even in com-
panies that were partially nationalized by government purchases of 
corporate stock. For example, the Government could have exercised its 
power as the majority shareholder in GM and Chrysler to require sig-
nificant changes in production models to address climate change and 
loss of market share to more energy-efficient foreign competitors. 
Instead, only modest fuel economy standards were included as a con-
dition of the bailout (Wigglesworth et al., 2017), and these were 
promptly denounced by the Atlas-affiliated Heritage Foundation (Gat-
tuso, 2009). 
Carroll et al. (2019, p.780) argue that in response to the GFC “[s]tate 
intervention…had been used [..] simply as a stop-gap policy measure to 
protect the interests of capital, stock market valuations, the functioning 
of markets, underwrite (socialize) market excess, and restore investor 
confidence.” Similarly, Mirowski (2013, p.347) argues: 
One might regard this innovation as co-opting the very idea of 
nationalization of business firms from the history of the left, but 
turning it on its head, lumbering the state with only the failed assets 
off the crippled private balance sheets while leaving the remainder of 
the firm in private hands, to enjoy revived profitability. 
While we are, therefore, not the first to point out the possibility of 
‘neoliberal nationalizations’ (see also: Kiely, forthcoming), we aim to 
advance the understanding of this phenomenon through an in-depth 
exploration of a recent and particularly significant nationalization of 
fossil fuel infrastructure in Canada; a strategy that may be increasingly 
resorted to as fossil fuel corporations confront the widening risk of rapid 
devaluations, write-downs and losses of investor’s capital that are in no 
small part the result of their successful long-term obstruction of climate 
policy planning via the Atlas Network. 
3. Case study: The nationalization of the Trans Mountain 
Pipeline in Canada 
3.1. Context 
In 2015, the Liberal Party led by Justin Trudeau (the son of Pierre 
Trudeau) was elected to federal government on a platform that promised 
action on climate change. At the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Conference in Paris in November 2015, Trudeau 
declared that after years of inaction under the previous Conservative 
government, “Canada is back, my friends. Canada is back, and here to 
help” (Fitz-Morris, 2015, n.p.). The country committed to a greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction target of 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. 
Canada’s climate policy under Trudeau, adopted in December 2016, is 
known as the Pan Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate 
Change (ECCC, 2016). Central to the Framework is a system to price 
carbon. Canadian provinces and territories were given the option to 
implement their own carbon tax or cap-and-trade system. Any province 
or territory that did not develop such a system by 31 March 2019 would 
be subject to a federally imposed carbon price. Alberta Premier Rachel 
Notley (New Democratic Party/NDP) agreed to implement a carbon 
price in return for Ottawa’s support on pipelines (Laxer, 2019; Carter, 
2020). However, when Jason Kenney (United Conservative Party/UCP, 
ex-president of Atlas-affiliated Canadian Taxpayers Federation) became 
premier in 2019, his government repealed the consumer-level carbon 
price (the scheme for industrial emitters was only modified), leading the 
federal government to impose its backstop. Alberta (along with Ontario 
and Saskatchewan) launched a legal challenge, but ultimately lost; the 
Supreme Court declared the carbon pricing regime was constitutional in 
March 2021. 
Although it has held firm on carbon pricing, the Trudeau Govern-
ment has otherwise gone to great lengths to demonstrate its commit-
ment to the oil and gas industry. Canada has the world’s third largest oil 
reserves after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Trudeau has noted on more 
than one occasion that “’No country would find 173 billion barrels of oil 
in the ground and leave them there” (Trudeau, 2017, n.p.). The tar sands 
- heavy, tar-like oil that is mixed with clay and is found in parts of 
Western Canada, primarily Alberta - constitute 97 per cent of the 
country’s proven oil reserves (Natural Resources Canada, 2020). The 
Canadian tar sands are among the most carbon intensive large-scale 
crude oil operations in the world (Masnadi et al., 2018). More energy 
is required for extraction than is the case for conventional crude, and in 
some cases the product must undergo a process known as ‘upgrading’ 
before it can be refined. According to a report from the Pembina Institute 
(a non-partisan think tank), “the best estimate currently available sug-
gests a barrel of oil produced in Canada is associated on average with 
70% more GHG emissions than the average crude produced globally” 
(Israel et al., 2020, p.5). The industry has heavily publicised its efforts to 
improve the carbon intensity of tar sands production, but growth in 
production has led to an increase in absolute emissions of 456% between 
1990 and 2018 (ECCC, 2020) making it the “fastest-growing source of 
emissions in Canada” (Israel et al, 2020, p.4). 
As Alberta is landlocked and has limited refining capacity, bitumen 
must travel by pipeline or rail, either south to heavy-oil refineries in the 
US or to shipping ports on the west or east coasts. Five major new 
pipeline projects have been proposed in recent years: TransCanada’s 
(recently rebranded as TC Energy) Keystone XL and Energy East; 
Enbridge’s Northern Gateway and Line 3 Replacement; and Kinder 
Morgan’s TMEP. Keystone XL was rejected by the Obama administration 
in 2015, but then allowed to proceed when President Trump came into 
office. It was then cancelled for a second time in January 2021, by the 
Biden administration. Energy East was cancelled by TransCanada in 
2017. The Line 3 Replacement Project has largely been completed 
within Canada but is facing construction delays in the US related to 
opposition from tribal nations, community and environmental groups in 
Minnesota (Rieger, 2019; Stop Line 3, n.d.). Northern Gateway was 
rejected by the Trudeau Government in 2016 (Stendie and Adkin, 2016). 
3.2. The Trans Mountain Expansion Project 
The Trans Mountain Pipeline Company was created by a 1951 Act of 
Parliament. Bechtel had overall responsibility for design and construc-
tion of the project and founding shareholders included Imperial Oil 
(majority owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey, later Exxon), and 
Standard Oil of California (now Chevron) as well as Shell. The pipeline 
was in operation by 1953. BC Gas (later renamed Terasen) acquired all 
shares in the company in 1994 (Trans Mountain, n.d.). Texas-based 
Kinder Morgan acquired Terasen in 2005 for CAD6.9 billion. The com-
pany sold the natural gas distribution aspect of the business for CAD3.7 
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billion in 2007 (“Terasen Gas sold to Fortis in $3.7B deal”, 2007). Kinder 
Morgan Canada first proposed a major expansion of Trans Mountain in 
2012 (for a timeline of major events in TMEP history, see Fig. 1). The 
TMEP would add a second pipeline along the route of the existing one, 
tripling the amount of diluted bitumen oil (from 300,000 to 890,000 
barrels per day) that would reach the west coast. The project would 
significantly increase tanker traffic in Vancouver Harbour (Port of 
Vancouver, n.d.). 
From the outset, there was strong opposition to the project from First 
Nations, environmental groups, and several municipalities in the prov-
ince of British Columbia (BC). In addition to fears about the impacts of 
an oil spill along the route of the pipeline, there is considerable concern 
about increased tanker traffic and how this might affect the endangered 
resident orca whale population (Tsleil-Waututh Nation, 2015). The 
expansion of pipeline capacity would also facilitate further expansion of 
tar sands extraction at a time when the world needs to rapidly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (Cruickshank, 2019). 
On 19 May 2016, the National Energy Board (NEB), which took over 
responsibility for federal-level environmental assessment of energy 
projects in 2012 (under the Conservative Harper Government), released 
its final report on TMEP. The NEB (2016, p.xii) found “that the Project is 
not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects” and that it 
was in the public interest. It recommended that the federal cabinet 
approve the pipeline, subject to 157 conditions. Notably, the NEB (2016, 
p.161) did not consider the environmental or socio-economic impacts 
associated with upstream (extraction) or downstream (combustion) ac-
tivities related to the pipeline and only assessed the greenhouse gas 
emissions produced as a direct result of pipeline construction and 
operation. Additionally, the NEB defined the scope of its review to 
exclude proper consideration of project-related tanker traffic on the BC 
coast. 
Several First Nations, municipalities, environmental groups and the 
BC Government challenged the NEB approval in the Federal Court of 
Appeal (NEB, 2020). BC Premier John Horgan (NDP) also initiated a 
reference case in the provincial Court of Appeal to determine if his 
government could legally control the shipment of oil through the 
province on environmental grounds. The position taken by Horgan 
created a political conflict with Alberta, which was also governed by an 
NDP government, until an election in April 2019 when the UCP took 
power (see Fig. 1 for further political context). 
3.3. Neoliberal crisis narratives 
Founded in 1974, in the context of the rise of global environmen-
talism, the ‘energy crisis’ and Pierre Trudeau’s campaign for a national 
oil company, the Fraser Institute is the oldest of Canada’s eleven Atlas 
Network-affiliated neoliberal think tanks. It has received funding from 
ExxonMobil and the Charles Koch Foundation and has numerous board 
members that are also board members or (former) CEOs of major oil and 
gas firms. According to Neubauer (2018: 250) “virtually every major 
player in the oil patch” is a Fraser Institute member. Two other Atlas 
Network affiliated think-tanks feature in the list of “legitimators” in the 
Corporate Mapping Project’s “Fossil Top 50” list of the most influential 
players in Canada’s fossil fuel industry (Corporate Mapping Project, 
2017).5 The MacDonald Laurier Institute (MLI) is a much younger or-
ganization (founded in 2010); it has also received funding from the 
Charles Koch Foundation. The Manning Centre (recently rebranded as 
the Canada Strong and Free Network) was created in 2005 by Preston 
Manning, an oil industry consultant who moved into politics and foun-
ded Canada’s Reform Party in 1987. 
An analysis of reports and blogs from the websites of these 
organizations as well as media appearances and opinion pieces written 
by staff and board members, demonstrates the role that they played in 
pushing, along with the fossil fuel industry, two key crisis narratives that 
created a political environment in which the TMEP was seen as ‘too big 
to fail’. The first narrative focused on the impact for the economy, 
suggesting that Canada was losing substantial revenue because it is 
‘forced’ to sell oil to the US market. The second narrative suggested, 
more broadly, that the failure of the TMEP to advance had destroyed 
‘investor confidence’ in the country. Both narratives re-appeared in 
statements by the government justifying the nationalization. To be clear, 
there were other issues raised in the national discourse, for example 
claims about the number of jobs that the project would create (Allan 
2017). However, such claims did not feature prominently in the docu-
ments we reviewed and our aim is to highlight the specific role in the 
nationalization that was played by the neoliberal thought collective. 
3.3.1. The economic “crisis” 
Bitumen from the tar sands is priced as part of the Western Canada 
Select (WCS) index. Most North American oil gets the West Texas In-
termediate (WTI) price, and international oil is typically priced ac-
cording to the Brent Crude index. WSC is always lower than WTI (this 
differential is often referred to as a ‘price discount’). This is primarily 
because tar sands bitumen is a low-quality product (it is ‘heavy’ and has 
a high sulphur content) (Oil Sands Magazine, 2020) and because it must 
be transported long distances to reach major markets that can accept 
heavy crude (e.g., the Gulf Coast). For much of 2013 and 2014, there 
was an additional discount on WCS caused by a pipeline bottleneck in 
the US Midwest, but that was eliminated in 2015 (McKinnon et al., 
2016), aside from a short period in November 2017 when there was an 
outage on the Keystone export pipeline (Hughes, 2018). 
Neoliberal think tanks, including the Fraser Institute (Angevine & 
Green, 2016; Aliakbari & Stedman, 2018a), MLI (Crowley, 2015), and 
Manning Centre (Morgan, 2017) have, nevertheless, continued to focus 
on the price differential and industry bodies, in turn, cite the research 
from these thinktanks (CAPP, 2019). According to the narrative pushed 
by these groups, tar sands producers are currently ‘forced’ to sell oil to 
the US market because pipelines to ‘tidewater’ (i.e., the west and east 
coasts) are at full capacity, thus limiting the options for sale to markets 
in Asia or Europe. As an example, in an opinion piece on TMEP, Gwyn 
Morgan (2017), former CEO of fossil fuel company Encana Corp (now 
Ovintiv) and board member of both the Fraser Institute and the Manning 
Centre argued: 
After almost a decade and more than $1 billion spent on planning 
and regulatory filings, five major oil-export pipelines remain unbuilt, 
leaving us with no choice but to sell our oil to U.S. buyers at below 
world prices. Depending on the world price and other factors, the 
resulting captive-market discount has been as much as US$10 per 
barrel on the 3.8-million barrels per day exported to the U.S. That 
amounts to a US$38-million daily gift to Americans, who then export 
their own oil at the full international market price. 
The following year, the Government of Alberta (2018) included a 
similar estimate – that the industry was forgoing CAD30-40 million per 
day – in its third quarter fiscal update and economic statement. In the 
same month, an ‘independent’ report by Scotiabank (Perrault & John-
ston, 2018)—which provided CAD415 million in finance to the TMEP 
(BankTrack, 2017) and purchased CAD224 million shares in Kinder 
Morgan Canada when it went public (Allan, 2018) (i.e., it has a vested 
interest in the project’s completion)—argued that the delays to the 
project were costing CAD15.6 billion per year, or approximately 
CAD42.7/USD34 million per day. 
Importantly, proponents of this narrative fail to distinguish the 
financial impact that may be experienced by specific corporations with 
the effect on the national economy, deliberately conflating anticipated 
private oil profits with the national interest. This is an example of what 
5 The Corporate Mapping Project is a research and public engagement project 
led by the University of Victoria, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and 
Parkland Institute. 
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Gunster and Saurette (2014) and Neubauer (2017; 2018) refer to as 
“symbolic nationalization.” Presenting oil investor losses as losses for 
Albertans, or the country as a whole, obscures the reality that the 
province is among the lowest tax and royalty jurisdictions for fossil fuel 
extraction in the world (Adkin, 2016). 
Independent economists have highlighted other problems with the 
economic crisis narrative. As Rubin (2017, n.p.) argues: “While market 
diversification is, in principle, a laudable pursuit, in the case of Alberta’s 
bitumen it would result in even lower prices than tar sands producers 
currently get in their one and only North American market.” This is 
Fig. 1. Timeline of major events in history of TMEP (compiled by authors, all dollar amounts in CAD).  
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because there is a concentration of refineries along the US Gulf Coast 
that are capable of handling heavy oil. Shipments of oil through the 
existing Trans Mountain pipeline mainly end up in California rather than 
Asia (Wilt, 2018). Furthermore, transportation costs (TMEP pipeline 
tolls plus the costs of shipping by tanker) can create an even a greater 
price discount in the Asian market (Hughes, 2017). 
Rubin (2017) suggests that the real reason why the Canadian oil 
industry is pushing for pipelines is that it sees more future growth po-
tential in other markets than in the US, where the domestic shale boom 
has substantially reduced demand for petroleum imports. However, the 
expectations for growth in demand in Asia do not take into account the 
realities of a carbon-constrained world. 
3.3.2. The foreign investment “crisis” 
A recurring theme that arises in media coverage and government 
statements about the TMEP is that if public opposition to the project 
successfully derailed it, this would send a disastrous message to inter-
national investors about Canada being a bad place for business. A 
common line employed is the notion that Canada is increasingly seen as 
a country that “can’t get things done” (Robson, 2018; Coyne, 2018; 
Hoekstra, 2019). Appealing to nationalist sentiment to conflate the na-
tional interest with the private profitability of oil multinationals, this 
public relations narrative has been pushed by neoliberal think tanks, 
particularly the Fraser Institute. For many years, the Fraser Institute 
conducted an annual Global Petroleum Survey, which polled industry 
executives and managers about their concerns regarding taxes, regula-
tions, and other ‘barriers to investment’ and then ranked jurisdictions 
accordingly. The 2017 and 2018 editions specifically note that the 
“policy position” taken by the BC government on Trans Mountain 
“contributed to a lack of political stability in the province, which is a 
deterrent to oil and gas investment” (Stedman & Green, 2017, p.35; 
Stedman & Green, 2018, p.34). When Kinder Morgan suspended non- 
essential spending on TMEP in April 2018 (see further below), the 
Vice President and President of the Fraser Institute wrote that it was “the 
latest example of business investment collapsing in Canada” (Clemens 
and Veldhuis, 2018) while a Senior Fellow described it as “a massive 
blow to Canada’s attractiveness as a place to invest” (Green, 2018). 
There is no evidence that investors have, in fact, lost confidence in 
Canada. Overall, foreign direct investment increased in 2017 (prior to 
the nationalization) and in 2018 (Argitis & Hertzberg, 2019). The 
exodus of investors from the oil patch is attributable to both present and 
immanently foreseeable global market conditions. Tar sands are only 
profitable when oil prices are high and are prioritised for divestment as 
fund managers decarbonise, and as prices for solar, wind and battery- 
firmed electricity continue to fall along with surging investment in 
clean energy infrastructures. 
Focusing on ‘investor confidence’ is an effective public relations 
strategy that has been deployed in many other national contexts to 
manipulate public opinion and policy outcomes. Although it had no real 
basis in the actual situation in Canada, oil industry and pipeline sup-
porters were able to create the impression that delays to the TMEP were 
not just a problem for the oil industry or Alberta, but for all Canadians. 
3.4. The nationalization 
According to Kinder Morgan Canada’s filings to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, on 6 March 2018, company representatives met 
with Jim Carr, then Minister of Natural Resources, and his Chief of Staff 
in Houston, Texas. They “presented a request for the support that the 
Company would need from the Government of Canada in order to pro-
ceed with construction activities on the TMEP” (KM, 2018b, p.11). 
Kinder Morgan wanted the government to enact legislation to override 
any attempts by the BC government to stop the TMEP, and additionally 
to provide a financial backstop arrangement that would see Canada 
indemnify the company for all costs incurred, should it decide to 
abandon the project. 
On 27 March, Finance Minister Bill Morneau wrote to the Canada 
Development Investment Corporation (CDEV)6 (a holding company that 
owns and manages several Crown corporations) to ask for assistance and 
advice. In particular, he wanted CDEV to “Identify and evaluate the need 
for, benefits of, and potential options for Canada to financially or 
otherwise support Kinder Morgan Canada and to make the [TMEP] a 
reality” (Morneau, 2018a). CDEV’s work was referred to internally as 
“Project Last Spike”, presumably as a nod to the ceremonial final -
spike driven into the Canadian Pacific Railway (Canada’s first trans-
continental railway) in 1885, which is for some a symbol of Canadian 
unity. 
CDEV engaged John Carruthers – the former head of Enbridge’s 
failed Northern Gateway Pipeline project – to assist. He then recom-
mended several consultancies that could provide the federal government 
with the information needed to decide how to support Kinder Morgan 
(CDEV, 2018). He tapped Paul Anderson, formerly the Director of 
Environment and Land for the Northern Gateway Pipeline project, to 
write the due diligence report on the permitting, regulatory and land 
access risks facing the project. For a report on the anticipated economic 
outcomes of the project, he recommended Muse Stancil—the same firm 
that Kinder Morgan had commissioned to sell the economic benefits of 
the project to the NEB. 
While the various consultancies were preparing reports, the negoti-
ations between the federal government and Kinder Morgan continued. 
Despite initially proposing the backstop, Kinder Morgan appears to have 
backtracked in later meetings in March, noting that the proposal was 
“still under review” and that it “had concerns regarding the potential 
risks around the enforceability of a backstop agreement” (KM, 2018b, 
p.12). For its part, Canada was willing to provide a limited backstop 
subject to certain conditions. 
On 8 April 2018, Kinder Morgan made a public announcement that it 
would pull out of the project unless the federal government could pro-
vide certainty by 31 May that the BC government’s opposition would not 
block the project. The company argued that it faced “unquantifiable 
risk” (KM, 2018a). Following this announcement, Kinder Morgan 
retained TD Securities as its financial advisor to tap into the company’s 
“wide range of expertise in public and private merger and acquisition 
transactions” (KM, 2018b, p.13). This move suggests that the company 
was already angling to offload the project before a conference call on 10 
April when representatives of the Government of Canada floated a 
proposal for a 51 per cent equity acquisition in Trans Mountain Pipeline 
LP. Kinder Morgan’s response was to instead suggest a “100% sale sce-
nario” (KM, 2018b, p.13). 
Canada continued to push for the backstop option. On 30 April, 
Kinder Morgan proposed a purchase price of CAD6.5 billion. Canada 
counteroffered that the backstop could be made available to a private 
sector buyer and if none was forthcoming, the government would pur-
chase the assets for CAD2.3 billion plus an unspecified percentage of the 
approximately CAD1.1 billion of Kinder Morgan’s sunk costs. Kinder 
Morgan’s Board rejected this proposal (KM, 2018b). 
On 16 May 2018, Finance Minister Bill Morneau publicly announced 
that the federal government was prepared to offer Kinder Morgan – or 
any other future owner of the Trans Mountain project – indemnity for 
any financial losses incurred because of the BC government’s actions 
(Alini, 2018). Crucially, this indemnity would not shield the company 
from other risks such as the court cases initiated by First Nations groups. 
One journalist suggested that this was a strategic move on the part of 
Morneau “letting other players know that the asset is for sale in an 
attempt to establish a floor price for the project” (Ivison, 2018, n.p.). 
On 22 May, Canada proposed a purchase price of CAD3.85 billion but 
made the offer contingent on Kinder Morgan “obtaining certain 
governmental approvals that were not anticipated to be obtained until 
6 The Government now uses this abbreviation instead of the acronym ‘CDIC’, 
although some historic documents and text may still refer to ‘CDIC’. 
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mid-December” (KM, 2018b, p.15). The company’s Board was unwilling 
to accept either the proposed purchase price or the conditions attached 
to it. On 23 May, Kinder Morgan counter offered a sale price of CAD4.5 
billion, and Canada agreed (KM, 2018b). At this point, most of the 
consultant reports commissioned by CDEV had yet to be finalized. 
However, Muse Stancil’s final report had been delivered (CDEV, 2018). 
Unsurprisingly, Muse Stancil (2018, n.p.) concluded that the TMEP 
would provide economic benefits, including that it would “significantly 
influence Western Canada crude oil prices” and provide an addition 
CAD12 billion in oil revenue per year, a figure that was later cited in 
CDEV’s “Summary of Due Diligence” report (CDEV, 2018, p.7). Muse 
Stancil used a proprietary mathematical model to reach its conclusions, 
which means no one else can check the results (Graham, 2018). Notably, 
the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) later reported in an audit of the 
purchase that it was “difficult to determine the impact of the TMEP on 
the WTI-WCS price differential” (PBO, 2019, p.13). 
On 29 May, the federal government announced that it had come to an 
agreement with Kinder Morgan to purchase the Trans Mountain pipe-
line, TMEP, and related terminal assets (Department of Finance, 2018b). 
Parliament was not required to review the purchase decision because it 
was effectively a loan from one Crown corporation (Export Development 
Canada) to another (PBO, 2019, p.5). In explaining the decision to 
nationalize the pipeline, the government emphasized the economic 
importance of the project, but also the fact that the move would “[pre-
serve] Canada’s reputation as a good place to do business” (Department 
of Finance, 2018a, n.p.). Morneau (2018b, n.p.) noted that the deal 
would “reassure investors that Canada is a country that respects the rule 
of law and that gets big, important things done.” Morneau and others 
also made it clear that the government did not want to own a pipeline 
and that they would sell the assets to a private company as soon as 
possible. He later changed his tune slightly, suggesting that the gov-
ernment did not want to be a long-term owner, but that it would see the 
project through the construction phase before selling it (Wingrove, 
2018). 
Kinder Morgan Canada shareholders voted to approve the sale at a 
meeting on 30 August 2018. On the same day, the Federal Court of 
Appeal (FCA) ruled that the NEB’s review of the TMEP project was 
“impermissibly flawed” because it had not properly considered the 
impact of project-related tanker traffic on the marine environment, and 
in particular on endangered southern resident killer whales (FCA 2018, 
p.1). In addition, the court also found the government failed to fulfill its 
legal duty to consult First Nations that would be impacted by the project. 
Laxer (2019, p.8) argues that it was a “gross oversight” that the gov-
ernment did not include a “deal breaker clause” in the sale agreement 
with Kinder Morgan “to take into the account the possibility of the 
Court’s decision.” However, while the FCA ruling created a further delay 
for TMEP, it did not completely derail it. The federal government 
initiated additional consultations with First Nations and requested that 
the NEB rectify its omissions on the project’s impacts on the marine 
environment. The NEB issued a Reconsideration Report in February 
2019, which found that “Project-related marine shipping is likely to 
cause significant adverse environmental effects on the Southern resident 
killer whale and on Indigenous cultural use associated with the Southern 
resident killer whale” (NEB, 2019, n.p.). Nevertheless, the NEB recom-
mended approval of the project on the basis that the adverse effects “can 
be justified in the circumstances, in light of the considerable benefits of 
the Project and measures to minimize the effects” (NEB, 2019, n.p.). The 
federal government made its final decision to proceed with the TMEP on 
18 June 2019, the day after Parliament had passed a motion declaring a 
national “climate emergency.” 
3.5. Responses to the nationalization 
We categorize the nationalization of the TMEP as a neoliberal 
nationalization. Neoliberal pundits and industry created the perception 
of an economic crisis and a crisis of investor confidence, which helped to 
justify the government’s intervention. Industry insiders like John Car-
ruthers were critical in facilitating advice to the government that 
ensured an outcome beneficial to investors in the oil patch. Critically, 
the nationalization was not just un-opposed, it was instigated by Kinder 
Morgan. Trudeau and others in the government have also emphasized 
that the government does not intend to remain the owner of the pipeline 
for the long term, but only long enough to ‘de-risk’ it (Yedlin, 2018). 
If the government proves able to sell the pipeline, it is highly possible 
that it will do so at a loss. An audit of the purchase by the PBO (2019) 
found that CAD4.5 billion was at the high end of the range of possible 
values for the assets purchased. When Kinder Morgan first proposed the 
TMEP, the construction costs were estimated to be CAD5.4 billion; they 
have since risen to CAD12.6 billion (PBO, 2020). The PBO has also 
concluded that “the profitability of the Trans Mountain assets is highly 
contingent on the climate policy stance of the federal government” and 
that “if policy action on climate change continues to become more 
stringent, it is possible for the Trans Mountain assets to have a negative 
net present value” (PBO, 2020, p.5). Gunton et al. (2021, p. xiv) predict 
that “TMEP will result in a net loss to the federal government ranging 
from $2.1 to $6.9 billion if the government follows its stated plan to sell 
the [Trans Mountain] assets once TMEP is operational.” Thus, the only 
thing that has been socialized as a result of the purchase is the stranded 
asset risk associated with the project. 
Given our general argument, it is important to examine the responses 
to the nationalization by the neoliberal commentariat and oil industry 
more broadly. Atlas Network-affiliated groups reinforced the narrative 
about investor confidence and went so far as to claim that the nation-
alization was further proof of the government’s failure to provide a 
favourable ‘investment climate’. Fraser Institute fellows argued that “the 
harsh reality is that the [nationalization] is further evidence that Canada 
is closed for business when it comes to investment in our energy sector” 
(Aliakbari & Stedman, 2018a, n.p.). The MLI advanced a similar line, 
with the managing director Brian Lee Crowley (2018, n.p.) (also an MPS 
member) writing in the Financial Post: 
this decision will be seen by foreign investors as an admission of 
weakness, not a sign of strength. Ottawa is essentially saying that 
such infrastructure, previously built by private capital under known 
rules and under the protection of the law, is now being built in an 
atmosphere in Canada that is so hostile and unwelcoming that it no 
longer expects private investors to shoulder the risk. Considering 
that one half of all business investment intentions in Canada derive 
from the capital-intensive natural resource sector, the negative 
fallout is potentially huge for future living standards. 
However, these commentators stopped short of arguing against the 
nationalization. Ted Morton (2018, n.p.), a former Minister of Finance 
and Energy in the government of Alberta and fellow with the Atlas- 
affiliated Manning Centre argued “Let’s be clear: a federally owned 
pipeline is hardly what anyone wanted. But it’s better than no pipeline at 
all” and further that “Perhaps the one positive to come out of all of this is 
that we won’t have to listen to any more nonsense about social licen-
se.” Neoliberals clearly would have preferred that Trudeau had used 
every available option to over-rule the BC government and other op-
ponents of the pipeline, clearing a path for Kinder Morgan. For example, 
prior to the purchase, Dwight Newman (2018, n.p.) of MLI argued that a 
“clarified legal landscape might avoid the need to buy a pipeline” and 
Ted Morton (in Hislop 2017, n.p.) lamented that Trudeau would be 
“extremely reluctant to use the full panoply of federal powers to deal 
with civil disobedience and protesters.” However, once the deal was 
done, the narrative became that the government “had no choice but to 
buy it” (Speer, 2018) or was “forced to nationalize” (Aliakbari & Sted-
man 2018b, n.p.; Stedman & Aliakbari, 2019, n.p). Philip Cross (2018, n. 
p.) of MLI argued that “unrelenting opposition to the Trans Mountain 
pipeline expansion helped raise the uncertainty surrounding business 
investment in Canada to the point that the federal government resorted 
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to buying the project to keep it viable.” None of this commentary 
addressed the possibility that Kinder Morgan and other businesses in the 
oilsands may have sought a pre-emptive government bailout in antici-
pation of ongoing asset devaluations. 
The response from the peak industry body—the Canadian Associa-
tion of Petroleum Producers (CAPP, 2018)—was more upbeat: “The 
TMEP is critical infrastructure needed to move Canadian energy to 
world markets and restore investor confidence in Canada’s economy and 
political system. It signals Canada is open to business and energy trade 
with international investors.” However, CAPP (2018) was also careful to 
qualify that its support for the nationalization was due to the “excep-
tional circumstances” in this case. The President of the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce argued that the most important thing was that 
the purchase had “stopped what would have been a disaster for investor 
confidence” (Seskus, 2018, n.p.). Chris Bloomer, the CEO of the Cana-
dian Energy Pipeline Association, seemed unable to make up his mind on 
the subject, suggesting at one point that the Association was “deeply 
concerned that the government needed to purchase the project for it to 
be built and to assert federal jurisdiction” and did “not believe that this 
outcome will instill investor confidence in Canada” (Seskus, 2018, n.p.), 
but then in a separate instance reportedly agreed that the situation was 
an exceptional circumstance and the nationalization was necessary to 
restore business confidence (Morgan, 2018). 
While the responses from industry and neoliberal affiliates were, 
therefore, not overwhelmingly positive, we do not believe that this be-
lies our claim that this was a neoliberal nationalization. The responses 
are entirely consistent with how the industry and neoliberal think tanks 
approach any clash between their stated ideological position and the 
private material interests that they in fact exist to represent. In public, a 
modest effort will be made to appear consistent on the position that 
government intervention in the market is bad, but the focus of media 
output and lobbying will almost entirely be on instances where an 
intervention which might reduce the anticipated profitability of 
powerful industries is contemplated on public interest grounds. 
4. Conclusions 
Nationalization has long been associated with socialism by neo-
liberals, who have transformed it from one amongst many policy options 
available to government into a political swearword. However, as is clear 
from the GFC and from more recent discussions about the future of the 
fossil fuel industry, neoliberals are willing to accept nationalization, 
even actively advocate for it in certain circumstances. Neoliberals will 
support nationalization if it is framed as a measure of last resort (in a 
‘crisis’) and is temporary, allowing for risk to be socialized while profits 
eventually return to the private sector. Ultimately, neoliberal national-
ization is about protecting corporates from their own poor risk man-
agement and failure to adapt to changing market conditions. The only 
thing that is socialized in a neoliberal nationalization is risk; otherwise, 
the status quo is maintained. 
In the case presented here, the status quo of continued fossil fuel 
extraction in the face of a mounting climate emergency is something that 
fossil capital and the neoliberal advocacy network have worked hard to 
maintain. For decades, they have prevented effective climate policy and 
state-managed decarbonisation through propaganda and state capture 
(Gutstein, 2018). Despite these efforts, political and market sentiment is 
moving against fossil energy. Yet fossil corporates and their financial 
backers have continued to invest in projects foreseeably at risk of 
stranding, just as banks engaged in high-risk speculative finance in the 
lead up to the GFC. They have done so because profits were high, but 
also because they can rely on governments to bail them out. The pur-
chase of the Trans Mountain pipeline exemplifies a neoliberal nation-
alization, insofar as it pre-emptively compensates fossil corporates for 
the dangers of the unregulated environment that their own activism 
against climate policy achieved, and for poor investment decisions that 
were entirely voluntary. The case also demonstrates the deep integration 
between neoliberal policy advocacy networks and the fossil fuel in-
dustry, which we would argue is a crucial frontier for climate policy 
researchers in every relevant national and international context. 
While the distinction between different types of nationalization 
might be clear to scholars and oil industry advocates, it is less obvious to 
the general public. As such, neoliberal support for fossil-fuel nationali-
zation may backfire, helping to overcome the ideological resistance they 
have long fostered to government intervention in the energy market. 
This is particularly relevant given that scholars and left-leaning think 
tanks have put forward proposals to nationalize fossil fuel companies, in 
order to neutralise opposition to climate policy and ensure that un-
tapped fossil fuel reserves remain unexploited (Lukas, 2014; Alperovtiz 
et al., 2017; Gowan, 2018; Spross, 2018; Aronoff, 2020). This could be 
the next logical step in efforts to create post-carbon renewable energy 
democracy, through the re-municipalization of energy networks and 
service delivery (Routledge et al., 2018) or publicly owned clean energy 
companies. Proponents of such ideas can point to neoliberal nationali-
zations like the TMEP in making their case. After all, if business and 
governments are willing to accept nationalization with little public 
benefit for a fabricated economic/investor confidence crisis, why not for 
an actually-existing climate emergency? 
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